Much of Christian “Just War” concepts come from Augustine. Augustine lived just after Constantine had made the Church the universal religion of the Roman Empire, an Empire in which Constantine and his several hundred thousand troops massacred the opposing forces. However , at the time, there we fear amongst many that Christians were pure pacifists and would not fight to defend the Empire. This was despite the fact that Constantine had many Christians in his forces. Augustine saw this as a potential theat. Thus evolve the construct of just war, namely a permitted use of deadly force. At first a simple dictate and then a more all-encompassing one. The Church has stated a recent construct of the “just war” theory[1]. The Church Catechism notes:
2307 The fifth commandment forbids the intentional destruction of human life. Because of the evils and injustices that accompany all war, the Church insistently urges everyone to prayer and to action so that the divine Goodness may free us from the ancient bondage of war.
2308 All citizens and all governments are obliged to work for the avoidance of war. However, "as long as the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed."
2309 The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. the gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time: - the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain; - all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; - there must be serious prospects of success; - the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. the power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.
These are the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the "just war" doctrine. The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.
2310 Public authorities, in this case, have the right and duty to impose on citizens the obligations necessary for national defense. Those who are sworn to serve their country in the armed forces are servants of the security and freedom of nations. If they carry out their duty honorably, they truly contribute to the common good of the nation and the maintenance of peace.
2311 Public authorities should make equitable provision for those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms; these are nonetheless obliged to serve the human community in some other way.
2312 The Church and human reason both assert the permanent validity of the moral law during armed conflict. "The mere fact that war has regrettably broken out does not mean that everything becomes licit between the warring parties."
Now Aquinas was an additional exponent of a version of the “just war” theory Augustine had actually taken from the ancient Romans, such as Cicero. For a war to be just, it must be commanded by someone in authority, there must be a just cause, and it must be carried on without disproportionate violence. It is not justifiable to lie to an enemy, since that would destroy the trust that will be needed to restore peace. [2]
Now Uhlmann noted[3]:
Augustine’s argument was later amplified, most notably by St, Thomas Aquinas, who specified three criteria for the ius ad helium:
(1) Only legitimate public authority may declare war.
(2) It may be waged only for a just cause (originally thought to encompass the rectification of wrongs, but now largely confined to self-defense),
(3) It requires a right intention (the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil, as opposed to hatred, revenge, or the pursuit of glory and power). Later refinements of the Thomistic argument have elaborated four additional criteria, as set forth in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
(4) The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain,
(5) All other means for putting an end to it must be shown to be impractical or ineffective (often referred to as “last resort”).
(6) There must be serious prospects of success.
(7) The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders greater than the evil to be eliminated.
Let us examine these seven criteria in the context of the two current wars; Iran and Ukraine.
|
Criteria |
Iran |
Ukraine |
|
Legitimate Authority
|
President |
President |
|
Just Cause Self Defense
|
Clear and present danger of nuclear attack as stated and demonstrated by adversary
|
Intention to aggregate lands |
|
Right Intent (Avoid Evil)
|
Avoided massive civilian and military fatalities
|
Massive civilian casualties |
|
Aggressors Damage Grave and Certain[4]
|
Known grave damage from nuclear attack to massive civilians.
|
Ukraine presented no threat |
|
Last Resort
|
Decades of negotiating to no avail
|
Just a sudden attack |
|
Prospect of Success
|
High expectation due to gross imbalance of power
|
Highly problematic |
|
Limited Harms
|
High tech targeting of enemy sites and no civilian attacks
|
Deliberate civilian targeting |
Yet as Uhlmann noted:
The Catechism of the Catholic Church recognizes as much. After setting forth the specific criteria for just war, it declares: “The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have the responsibility for the common good.
Now one must examine the mindset of the opponent. On the one hand the pope is mandating Catholic doctrine, which we have noted above. On the other hand the opponent is Musim and has a different set of religious mandates. As Ebstein notes ( Ebstein, In the Shadows of the Koran: Said Qutb’s Views on Jews and Christians as Reflected in his Koran Commentary, 2009 by Hudson Institute, Inc ):
According to the majority of jurists and scholars in classical Sunni Islam, the precept of jihad underwent four chronological stages during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad.
At first, while Muhammad was still in Mecca and suffering as he did from the fierce opposition of the unbelievers, he was ordered by Allah to disseminate the message of Islam by peaceful means such as persuasion, and was forbidden to involve himself in violent activities of any kind.
In the second stage, after Muhammad had emigrated to al-Madina, he was ordered to perform solely defensive jihad—that is, to defend himself and his followers if necessary.
In the third stage, after the Islamic strength had grown in military, political, and economic terms, Muhammad was allowed to perform aggressive jihad and to initiate attacks against the nonbelievers, though within certain restrictions (such as the prohibition to fight during the four holy months.)
In the fourth and final stage, Muhammad was ordered to perform both defensive and aggressive jihad, at all times and wherever possible (under various rules of conduct).
It was this final stage which abrogated (nasikh, from naskh, “abrogation”) previous stages and which was accepted from then on as the legal rule binding the Islamic community. While various modern Islamic liberals had attempted to reformulate the precept of jihad according to one of the three initial stages, Qutb stresses that it is only the fourth and last one which is relevant to Muslims, and has been so ever since the final years of the Prophet’s activity
Thus one can argue that the enemy in this case has a drastically disparate mindset, one that enables the actions under just law theory.
Now Heresy and heretics have been abundant in Church history. They were burned, exiled, beheaded. Some recently become Professors and authors. But what is heresy and how does one identify heresy and heretics?
Leff notes tha[5]t:
“Heresy is defined by reference to orthodoxy.”
Namely there must first be an agreed upon orthodoxy, statement of faith, agreed upon, and then a heretical act or statement must then be shown to clearly contradict that orthodoxy. The demonstration of this contradiction is accomplished at a council meeting or the like. One, including the Bishop of Rome, cannot just single handedly declare a heretic.
The orthodoxy in this case are the seven “rules” of just war. As we have argued, the Iran War is clearly a just war, Ukraine is not. The pope has stated that Iran is not a just war. Given the simple definition of heresy, the popes statements are unambiguously heretical, and thus the pope is a heretic.
The NY Times noted[6]:
Last year, Pope Leo XIV questioned whether the “inhuman treatment of immigrants” is consistent with being pro-life.
This year, on Easter, he said, “Let those who have the power to unleash wars choose peace!”
On Friday, he posted a message that anyone who is a disciple of Jesus Christ “is never on the side of those who once wielded the sword and today drop bombs.”
The above statements as well as a massive number of others by Leo assert indirectly and directly that the President is conducting an unjust war. We have clearly and simply shown using Catholic doctrine that it is clearly not the case.
1. We have demonstrated Catholic Doctrine
2. We have shown two cases of Doctrine and actuality. Clearly the Iran case is Just and the Ukraine is not.
3. We have shown the pope has stated that the Iran case is pari passu with Ukraine and no just. I have found not papal analysis of either case however.
4. The conclusion is simple. The Doctrine is followed on Iran and the pope states it has not. Thus denial of Doctrine. The pope is therefore heretical on this topic.
[1] https://www.vatican.va/content/catechism/en/part_three/section_two/chapter_two/article_5/iii_safeguarding_peace.html
[2] See Aquinas, Summa, 2–2, q. 40, a. 1, a. 3.
[3] Uhlmann, The use and abuse of just-war theory, vol. ill number 3, summer 2003 essays, Claremont Review of Books https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/the-use-and-abuse-of-just-war-theory
[4] See Worldwide Effects Of Nuclear War: Some Perspectives U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975.
[5] Leff, Heresy in the latter Middle Ages, Manchester University Press, 1967
