Law by the Few

Recently one of the Harvard Law School types wrote a paper in The Atlantic proposing what he terms "Common-good constitutionalism" He describes it as follows:

Common-good constitutionalism is not legal positivism, meaning that it is not tethered to particular written instruments of civil law or the will of the legislators who created them. Instead it draws upon an immemorial tradition that includes, in addition to positive law, sources such as the ius gentium— the law of nations or the “general law” common to all civilized legal systems— and principles of objective natural morality, including legal morality in the sense used by the American legal theorist Lon Fuller: the inner logic that the activity of law should follow in order to function well as law.
Common-good constitutionalism is also not legal liberalism or libertarianism. Its main aim is certainly not to maximize individual autonomy or to minimize the abuse of power (an incoherent goal in any event), but instead to ensure that the ruler has the power needed to rule well. A corollary is that to act outside or against inherent norms of good rule is to act tyrannically, forfeiting the right to rule, but the central aim of the constitutional order is to promote good rule, not to “protect liberty” as an end in itself. Constraints on power are good only derivatively, insofar as they contribute to the common good; the emphasis should not be on liberty as an abstract object of quasi-religious devotion, but on particular human liberties whose protection is a duty of justice or prudence on the part of the ruler.

 This elitist approach assumes that there exists some select group of the ordained who can decide what is the common good. Such a group would thus have a say on what we can and cannot do.

The Founders were in many ways the result of the Individualist school based on Natural Rights and the resulting Natural Law. As I have noted regarding Natural Rights, we humans have a sense of what we have a right to, driven by the genetic makeup of our limbic system. Western political individualism is embedded in our very own genetic code. However there is always a class of people who want to dominate others. Fortunately our Founders understood this and as such we have the Bill of Rights. These rights are the expression of Natural Rights, limits on man made laws so as not to trample on our person.

Individualism is a powerful driver for the overall success of the United States. We have always had groups of people who want to destroy that fabric, ranging from Marxists, Communists, Socialists, and the select group of self appointed academics. This above statement is a cl*ear indication that we have imminent dangers arising from the Academy, all too frequently from those who deem their opinions are better than any other individual. The come from echo chambers whose members deem themselves as holders of truth.

Regrettably students can be manipulated to see this as a path to success, namely believing in and proselytizing this construct. Originalism is a view of the Constitution, but more importantly the essence of our Natural Rights can only be defended and secured if we recognize these characters who seek to destroy it and secure for themselves abject power.

Public Intellectuals and Religion

I have written extensively on the “Public Intellectual”, a term often self-applied as a term of adulation. But this becomes ever so more an issue when that person also assumes the mantle of religious spokesperson, at least for their point of view.

The University of Notre Dame, that football school out in the mid-west, is hosting a conference on this which is described as[1]:

This international conference, hosted by the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study, will focus on the roles played by public intellectuals—persons who exert a large influence in the contemporary society of their countries by virtue of their thought, writing, or speaking—in various countries around the world and in their different professional roles. Leading experts from multiple disciplines will come together to approach this elusive topic of public intellectualism from different perspectives.

The agenda includes such topics as[2]:

1.     The Religious Leader as Public Intellectual

2.     Islam and the Public Intellectual

3.     The Blogger as Public Intellectual

4.     The Economist as Public Intellectual

5.     The Former Diplomat as Public Intellectual

6.     The Philosopher as Public Intellectual

Now what do these who fill these roles have to say, is it if any value, and if not who are the putative true Public Intellectuals in their areas who have such statements to make. We examine these issues somewhat herein. Moreover there is the compelling question of communitarianism versus individualism. Namely as one looks at the Religious issue, examining the now current issue of Social Justice, are we individually responsible or responsible as a community?

If one examines the recent Treatise from the Vatican[3] one would gather that the Church has almost eliminated individual responsibility for communitarian approaches, in fact the very call of Social Justice is Justice emanating from Society as a whole and not from the individual to others. In fact Social Justice demands that the individual is sublimated to the community, society, and that there is some magic group of all perfect society managers who make the “right” decisions for all.The Treatise specifically states (p 145, from Vatican II):

"If economic activity is to have a moral character it must be directed to all men and to all peoples. Everyone has the right to participate in economic life and the duty to contribute, each according to his own capacity, to the progress of his own country and to that of the entire human family. If, to some degree, everyone is responsible for everyone else, then each person also has the duty to commit himself to the economic development of all."

Now economic activity is neither moral nor amoral in and of itself. It is akin to farming, to hunting, to breathing, to perhaps even reproducing. The act has a moral element when and only when it causes an immoral act; that is it causes a robbery or murder. Now to view in economic terms the statement "each according to his own capacity..." is as Marxian as "to each according to his means and to each according to their needs..."  The statement is full of communitarian elements and devoid of individualistic responsibilities. This is a prototypical statement from Vatican II, and in ways it is as we shall discuss the basis of the conflict resulting therefrom as described by Wills.

The concept of their being a Social Doctrine of the Church is in many ways a total denial of individual responsibility. Yet the very essence of the teachings in the New Testament is directed towards the Individual. Thus in a way the progression of the Church’s doctrine has been in response to the Liberalism and Enlightenment doctrines and rather than emphasizing the Individual duties the response was to create a parallel universe which “agrees” with these “pagans” but uses words more akin to what the Vatican would be comfortable with.

From an interview with one of the speakers, the erstwhile Religious one defines Justice as follows[4]:

For me it is a commitment to justice, to making the good of others, the good of the world community the ground on which I make choices. Justice is more than niceness or random acts of kindness. Justice is a principle of life. For example, from a religious perspective in this day and age, I believe justice requires me to have as much respect for Islam, as I do for Catholicism. We do Islam a great disservice if we judge the entire tradition on the basis of a few radicals. My spirituality directs me to recognize the spiritual foundation, the truth and vision in every religion.

John Ryan, a Catholic priest in the late 19^th through mid-20^th century wrote a great deal on the concept of Justice, and Distributive Justice as her termed it. His view was that it was necessary to take from the rich to support the poor and he was a severe critic of capitalism. Moreover his views were that “society” owed the poor and he saw the individual qua individual as irrelevant.

As Ryan states[5]:

“The Christian conception of the intensive limitations of private ownership is well exemplified in the action of Pope Clement IV, who permitted strangers to occupy the third part of any estate which the proprietor refused to cultivate himself. Ownership understood as the right to do what one pleases with one’s possessions is due partly to the Roman law, partly to the Code Napoleon, but chiefly to the modern theories of individualism.”

What Ryan says is that no individual or person has the true and clear right to their property. In fact the Clement argument is one of using the fallow land. Farmers left one third of their land fallow so as to allow it to recover. Clement then believe that fallow land should be put to use, albeit destroying the value in the future. No one has ever claimed Pope’s were infallible in science and agriculture.

Ryan then quoted Herbert Spencer:

“Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning, these are the sources to which these titles may be traced. The original deeds were written with the sword rather than the pen; not lawyers but soldiers were the conveyances; blows were the current coin given in payment; and foe seals blood was used in preference to wax.”

Strange as this may be as a quote, it does allow him to draw in Spencer, the strong promoter of 19^th Century individualism to justify his claims; a claim that simply states that no property has any “legal” and read that as “moral” basis. In fact Ryan’s belief is that not only should the one third be shared but that there should be no private property at all.

The problem here is a serious one. In the Gospels there was always an acceptance of several important issues:

(1) What was the State was the State’s and what was God’s was God’s. For example you had to obey God’s law but if that violated the State’s law so be it and you thus suffered the consequences. Thus the martyrs. God’s law was imposed on the individual, not the group, martyrs died individually.

(2) The duty to obey God’s law was incumbent upon the individual. This was to a degree a break with the Old Testament Law as applied to the Israelites, who were viewed as a group. Jews as a group, and to a degree as individuals in the Group, had the duty. But since the Christians were polyglot and disparate, the group identity was abandoned in terms of their religious duty, and thus the burden was on the individual. What did “you” do, not what does the group do.

Now who are putatively true Public Intellectuals in the area of religion? I would argue that Gary Wills fits the profile quite well. He is a true intellectual, as evidenced by his wealth of experience and understanding, and he addresses key issues worth the discussion, and he does so with a level of expertise worth of an intellectual. Finally he communicates in a manner which is readily available to a wide audience, albeit educated, yet he does not write for the specialist.

I am reminded of my first Wills book, “Bare Ruined Choirs” published in 1972 and reflecting on Vatican II and the change in the Catholic Church. He was no an apologist, far from it, he demonstrated a breath of understanding the exceeded the classic religious writer. One may not agree with Wills on everything, and I am one who has many point of disagreement, but his writings are always worth reading. He is not a Hans Kung, namely he does not personalize and internalize his invective, and in fact one finds no vitriol in his words.

Thus who are the true Public Intellectuals? Posner[6] has taken a cut at that a few years ago, and I wrote a brief work examining that plus the issue of individualism[7]. The Posner discussions attempt to demonstrate the decline in the Public Intellectual. One can readily argue that the decline may in many ways have been a collapse after the interdiction of the Internet.

Let us examine two of the speakers at this conference; strangely bot are somewhat obese in my opinion, which may in itself reflect an attitude. The religious public intellectual purports to be both a contemplative and yet a rather outspoken public figure. Her writing is nowhere near that of Wills, and in fact can be somnolence creating. She appears to be confrontational with the Vatican and has developed a clan of believers who may be almost cultist in nature. She lacks the true intellectual base and her issues are ephemeral rather that of substance.

The economics representative is acerbic and critical to an extreme of those with whom he differs. If one examines his blog one see a flow of almost venom like comments against those who show even the slightest level of disagreement. Both however believe apparently in the anti-individualism of the left.

Finally, I return to Wills and a possible cause of all this mess. I would argue that it was the strength of the arguments of Augustine, as demonstrated in the brief book by Wills[8] that set the path to this point of view. Strange as it may be, for on the one hand it was Augustine that introduced individual salvation via Grace but on the other hand institutionalized Original Sin, a communitarian artifact. Wills argues that there are hidden expressions of Augustin in such works as his Confessions, and I would argue that they are indeed.

Augustine became a believer of the evil of sex, and that in many ways was a result of his own lurid and self-centered life. He fathered a child and then abandoned the child, who eventually died at a young age. He abandoned his “wife” and took up the Faith, even though his “wife” was a Christian before him. As they say the worst prohibitors of habits are those who have forsaken them; thus former smokers are adamant anti-smokers, and converts are more true believers that those born into the faith. Much of what we trouble about in today’s Catholic Faith may emanate from Augustine, the Reformation and Luther were a direct result therefrom. Perhaps Pelagius was right, as were the Donatists.

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[1] http://conferences.nd.edu/events/public-intellectualism-in-comparative-context-different-countries-different-disciplines

[2] http://ndias.nd.edu/assets/97153/pi_schedule_25_march_2013_web.pdf

[3] See Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, US Conference of Bishops, 2004.

[4] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-haag/what-is-prayer-a-conversa_b_603667.html

[5] See Ryan, Distributive Justice, Macmillan, 1916, p. 23.

[6] See Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline, Harvard U Press, 2003.

[7] http://www.telmarc.com/Documents/Books/Public%20Intellectual%2001.pdf

[8] Wills, G., Augustine, Viking, 1999.

New Insight on Rawls

The book on John Rawls by Thomas Pogge is valuable contribution to the ever increasing body of professional literature regarding this late Harvard Professor and proclaimer of what Justice is. The book is overall a superbly written and presented addition to what is available. It is an excellent interpretation of Rawls’ works and has parts of the discussion which present some semblance of balance with other thinkers; here I argue the discussions on Nozick and Sandel, both also of Harvard, are very worthy additions in the discussion. Rawls writings opened up a new dialog for political scientists in the late 20^th century by espousing a humanist and communitarian approach to Justice, where Justice meant the sharing of a society’s wealth, and inherently assuming that what any individual achieved was done so in the context of the contributions of all those around them.

Let me first begin by providing a summary of the Rawlsian theory. The essence of Rawls’ approach to “Justice” is predicated on three elements;[1]

Original Proposition: There exists a means and method for a society to establish a Contract amongst and between them. This Contract thus created in this society of the just is one that maximizes the return on every transaction to the least of the individuals in the society.[2]This approach to contractarianism is one related to individuals in a non-bargaining environment establishing between and amongst them a “contract” to govern their society.[3] There are two elements contained herein.

The first is the essence of a contract, and in fact a form of social contract between the members of society and amongst them as a whole. This is a restatement of the classic contractarian view of a society.

The second element is that of a view towards man as a constrained and unconstrained view of human nature. [4]

The unconstrained view states that man, individually and in concert, has the capabilities of feeling other people’s needs as more important than his own, and therefore we all act impartially, even when the individuals own interest are at stake.

The constrained view is to make the best of the possibilities which exist within the constraint.

For example, the constrained view of universal service is one which would state that if it costs a certain amount to provide the service, an there is a portion of the society not able to purchase the service, then there is no overriding need to provide it if such a provision is uneconomical and places a significant burden on the other member of society. The unconstrained view, as a form of socialism, states that if there is the least of us in want then they should have access to it at whatever cost.[5] Rawls approach to this contract is one wherein the individuals in the society collect themselves as individuals, and agree to a plan for the operations of that society, and they accomplish behind some veil of anonymity. That is no one has the benefit of knowing who may be getting more or less, including themselves.

First Principle of Justice: each person shall have equal rights and access to the greatest set of equal fundamental personal liberties.

Second Principle of Justice: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they both, (i) provide the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. and (ii) attached to positions available to each individual under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

This latter element of the Rawlsian world is often viewed as a Schupeterian form of socialistic control. If we were to define the public welfare by a function as some measure W, and each individual listed as a variable I, then the policy choice, which we would call P, is chosen such that the welfare is maximized for the least advantaged. What this states is that we want to maximize the society welfare subject to the constraint that no individual suffers due to the change or execution of a policy P.

We can compare this to the utilitarian school which states that we seek the maximization of the average welfare for all of society, sort of a raising of all the boats approach which is not constrained on what happens to any one individual, but to society as a whole. This approach is the basis of the Ramsey tax policy. The Ramsey approach is Rawlsian whereas the approach of an Adam Smith or other utilitarians is the average approach.[6]

Now let me address several of the specific sections of the book. This is in no way inclusive; it merely highlights some of the worthwhile parts of the book.

pp 11-15. The involvement of Rawls in WW II is a major turning point in his life. He fought in the battle of Leyte in the Army as an enlisted man, albeit a college graduate. His decision, frankly a wise one to not obtain a commission, since if he had he could and most likely would have been drawn into Korea, did place him in places of significant carnage. I had written a book on Navy actions during Leyte, my father was there, and the brutal land as well sea engagements left lasting change on all the men involved. Although the author does reflect this it clearly is of interest to have explored this seminal event on the part of Rawls and better understand how this set the path for his future views of human existence and the relationships he would suggest imposed on society. In my experience interviewing dozens of men who fought there the effect was lasting and world view changing. Although presented, it truly deserves deeper understanding.

p 20. The author presents some of the conflicts during the 60s which further made for his world view, especially the perceived draft inequity. For example, for Rawls, he could not understand education deferments, that is, those, say studying engineering, being deferred while those, not in college, being drafted. In essence this was a utilitarian approach, in that it was assumed that the draft scheme benefitted society on average better than equality in the draft. To Rawls, the very poorest student or person should have equal treatment. One sees a kernel of his theory of Justice emerging.

p 28. The author starts with the statement: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.” My concern here is several-fold. First, it is declaratory without a basis. Second, fails to define Justice, virtue, and social, and I will assume I understand the term institutions. This is a Rawls statement, the beginning of his work. The second part of the sentence missing is “as truth is of systems of thought.” Yes Rawls uses this in almost a Marxian declarative manner, or like Rousseau, man and his chains, but it leave one wondering what this justice thing really is. The author does begin defining it and his use of social justice for Rawlsian Justice is telling. For social justice had already had a long history in Progressive movements for almost a century by the time the book was published. Again one wonders how much of this also influenced Rawls.

p 29. The author discusses somewhat the origin of the Theory of Justice. One would like, as I have stated before, to have seen a more expansive overview, one linking a bit more of past social justice thought. I did find his analysis on this page reminiscent of Scholastic thinking and methodology.

p 30. There is a discussion of happiness. One is left asking what happiness is. This of course is a problem with many who approach this area, use of terms like happiness, fairness, all too often are in the eye of the beholder and have long histories of use by different people for different purposes. However the author will return to this important issue later.

pp 43-44. This is an excellent introductory approach to Rawls. The author clearly discusses the concepts of (i) consequentialism, (ii) humanism, and (iii) normative individualism, all elements of the Rawlsian theory.

pp 48-48. The discussion on the anonymity issue, the veil of ignorance, is reasonably well done. My only difficulty was the detailed discussion was less than fully descriptive.

pp 53-54. Here the author does go into some detail on Rawls own objections to happiness. This I found quite enlightening and exceptionally well done. The two objections to using happiness are clear and to the point and definitely worth spending some time on.

pp 67-67. This is the maximum versus average argument, it is my argument from Mill and the Utilitarians to Rawls and the Redistributionists. Rawls wants to consider the least of us in his use of Justice, Mill just wants to make sure on average we are all just fine. Mill and the Utilitarians have a more “democratic” metric, namely the group on average, and Rawls want to make certain that we do not disenfranchise anyone.

p 75. The author has an interesting discussion regarding the allocation of goods, redistribution and society. It is a critique of certain elements of Rawls but clearly worth examining.

pp 178-185. The author compares Rawls to some of his critics. He considers two at length, Nozick and Sandel. The Nozick opposition is characterized by three objections: (i) that Rawls is a redistributionist, and this violates fundamental property rights, (ii) that Rawls in his redistributionist view demands a sharing on equal basis denying individual contributory differences, and (iii) the Rawlsian view of collectivism, namely that any single individual benefits from the contributions of all in society and thus no individual stands alone, only on the efforts of all others in society. In essence Rawls is an anti-individualist, and Nozick is a libertarian. This is not exactly at total odds, but it is fairly close.

pp 185-188. Here the author does a comparison with Sandel and his communitarian views. Although, not at as great a set of odds as with Nozick, the author does a superb job in making these contrasts.

Overall the author provides a professional, articulate, accurate and highly readable and accessible overview and analysis of Rawls. As I have indicated the deeper analysis and understanding of Rawls the man would be exceedingly useful. For example, what led him to evolve these ideas, what resonances helped him along the way, why did he believe that he was right and others were in error? Understanding Rawls as a philosopher I believe requires understanding Rawls as a man. I have yet to fully see that task achieved. Yet this book is a very valuable contribution to that effort.

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[1]See Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls, Stanford Press, 1990, for an excellent expository of the Rawlsian theory.

[2]Indeed in the Rawlsian world the individual posits their position and does so without any negotiation and thus posits a position assuming that that individual will be the least amongst players in that society. Such a position, to create justice in that society, is a maxi-min position.

[3]This is the same in many ways of the Social Contract envisioned by Rousseau.

[4]See Sowell, Conflict of Visions, Basic, 2002, pp. 18-24. Sowell does present an interesting a simple analysis of several of the issues.

[5]See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper, 1942, pp. 167-186. Specifically, he defines socialism as; “an institutional pattern in which the control over the means of production and over production itself is vested in a central authority- or, as we may say, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not the private sector.”

[6] This is the Baumol Willig theorem in economics which uses the first Rawlsian approach to maximizing the return subject to a single constraint; namely that the monopolist suffers no harm. This is of course a different twice to Schumpeterian socialism, wherein a monopolist usurps the power of the state for its own benefit.

Individualism and the Left: Reconstructing Individualism, A Review

In the book, Reconstructing Individualism, by Albrecht, one finds an interesting attempt by the left to redefine the concept. Although difficult to read, it is not well written, its portrays the mind of the left with some clarity.

Individualism as a concept suffers from a lack of consistent definition. In this book by Albrecht it is impossible to find any definition, especially of what he seems to call classic individualism. The intent of the work one gathers is to “reconstruct individualism” along the lines of Emerson, Dewey et al using a pragmatic bent most likely according to James. Strange choice to build a view of individualism upon, for at best Emerson looks at the individual in an inward sense, along the lines of being true to yourself and Dewey was in effect a Marxist in his world view, having been a member of the Defense team for Trotsky in his trial resulting with the break with Stalin. Thus even incorporating Dewey stretches the view of Individualism to an extreme, for even Dewey in his works on Individualism demonstrates at best contempt, and in his Sophist way often redefines his form in a manner disjoint from any Individualism coming from past thinkers.

The book argues that “our conceptions of individualism have remained trapped within the assumptions of classic liberalism…” The author then presents what he considers a reinterpreted individualism, called reconstructing individualism, by examining the works of Emerson, James, Dewey and Ralph Ellison. As I am familiar most with the first three, my comments shall be limited to his observations thereto.

Let me start on p. 1. The author states “America has a love-hate with individualism.” From this point on I have a problem, for the author never seems to directly define what he means. Individualism has had an ever changing set of concepts and constructs. One can argue, as does the Marxist Meiksins-Wood, in Citizens to Lords p 226, that one of the first individualists was Ockham, focusing both around his arguments regarding nominalism as well as his opposition to the Avignon papacy. The Ockham school of individualism is also best explained by McGrade in the volume by Tierney and Linehan, Authority and Power; p. 149-165.

Individualism has many faces, not just the Lockean view or that of the Scottish enlightenment. The quote on the last page by de Tocqueville, wherein he criticizes individualism as he observed it was best analyzed by Schleifer in his work The Making of de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, pp 305-322. Simply the Schleifer argument therein is that de Tocqueville was reacting more to the change and threats in French society and failed to adequately understand the American view. American individualism, in the early 19^th century, was note one of an isolated self-reliance but one where the associations noted by de Tocqueville managed to assist communities and individuals. It was no a society of separation but one of association and cooperation.

Thus one is somewhat amazed by the title of the first chapter, “Individualism has never been tried” since it not only was but became the very foundation of the American spirit for a long period of time.

Thus the main critique is the lack of definition, especially with any clarity, of what the author means by individualism. The argument he makes is somewhat sophist in approach by incrementally alleging elements which he then rejects.

On p 8 he speaks of Dewey’s democracy as community. Dewey was anything but an individualist. The essence of is educational philosophy was a centralized and common core of basic education. For example, Dewey was often in mortal combat with the Catholic Church in New York City since the Church had an education system disjoint from what Dewey wanted. Dewey vehemently opposed the Church’s parochial schools. Dewey in so opposing any alternative was then effectively rejecting any attempt at individualism. He sought standards, standards that he and a select few would establish, to create a homogenized America.

Before continuing, again on p 8 the author describes what he calls a broad set of assumptions common to the four individuals whose work he intends to integrate. The first is an example of the style throughout:

“A pluralistic metaphysics that analyzes human activity, truth, power, and value as emerging and existing only within and against the limitations of specific conditions.”

Now frankly I have read this several dozen times, I have even tried to diagram the sentence. It makes no sense. Give it a try. Each word is a known term but placing them in this order seems to lead to an un-interpretable collection of words.

The most telling element of the text is in Endnote 2 on p 312 where the author attempts to demonstrate the pragmatic individualism of the current president while criticizing without any comment the opposing party. The key rule in writing documents which would stand the test of time is not to put such statements in the document. One now clearly understands the intent of the author to be the justification of the administration in power at the time of the writing and thus it may readily call into question the intellectual substance in view of the blatant political nexus.

Now Chapter 1 is dealing with interpreting Emerson as a Pragmatist, an interesting interpretation. On p 26 the author provides a reasonable overview of the philosophy of Emerson. On p 31 the author constructs a nexus between Emerson and William James, the son of a family friend and the prime mover of the American pragmatism movement. The evolution in pragmatic thought and the reification of religious thought can be readily seen in the progression from Emerson to James to Dewey. Emerson was clearly a product of the growing sense of American separatism, his speech at Harvard announcing the break with Europe was in a way the temporal instant in which the split was recognized, American was to “think” and thus act on its own, relying no longer on what Europe what to proffer. Thus in a sense the break that Emerson was creating even between his Universalism, anti-Trinitarian views, and the beginning of pragmatism are patched together by the author in this chapter. On p 36 there is a telling phrase when the author states:

“Here I depart from the assessment of Charles Mitchell, who concludes that James “wanted to make use of Emerson, not make sense of him, and his method was to mine Emerson for the valuable insights…” …James did conclude that Emerson’s voicing of monist and pluralist perspective revealed a lack of consistency…However … James went further … to “make sense” of the conflict between Emerson’s monism and his pluralism.” 

The issue may very well be at the heart of Pragmatism as explored by the author, a reasonable nexus between Emerson and James.

Chapter 2 deals with the individualism of Emerson. On p 55 the authors struggles with the issue of Emerson’s individualism. He states:

“Emerson’s individualism reflect is attempt to articulate an ethics commensurate with a world of limitation and power.”

Now as with many other statements I did have some difficulty here with what seems to be said. If this is an attempt to describe, define, delimit the “ethics” or behavior norms of society, a society which exists in a world with well-defined limits of wealth, goods, etc and a world controlled by power, namely a few who exert control over the many, then Emerson may have done so, albeit with limited success. On p 56 the author again continues this discussion as he discusses the essays of Emerson. On p 57 the author also discusses the idealism of Emerson, as a real practice of ethical and practical behavior.

On p 67 the author states:

“…Emerson contends that individuality can only be realized in a social context …. that the interaction between the individual and society must allow for the nourishment and growth of individuals most vital talents”

Classic individualism as seen in the time period would not disagree with this. Somehow the individualism used as the straw target of the author is some isolationism, a Thoreau like separatism at Walden, rather than just what was said, an ability to allow each to maximize their talents within a flexible community.

On p. 70 the author uses the classic quote from Emerson on “Self Reliance” where he compares the Harvard dandy to the New Hampshire back woodsman. The Harvard dandy fails and thus never gets the next chance but the New Hampshire lad, despite lack of a great education, through individual drive and fortitude succeeds again and again. In a close reading one sees the dandy with his large “community” of friends and advocates, suffers an early and permanent failure, but the lad from New Hampshire with no more that his own “self-reliance’ never sees a failure. This is both consistent with individualism yet the author seems hard pressed to take it for what it says.

Chapter 3 begins the pragmatism of William James. Overall his presentation of James flows well as does his discussion of James’ view of individualism.

Chapter 4 is on Dewey, and here one may have some concern. Dewey was a complex person who was often at odds with the institutions which he was involved with, like his departure from Chicago, as well as his somewhat alienated location at Columbia. He was a strong supporter of Marxist causes, although not an outright Communist, he also was a key player in the general attitude of gross anti-Catholicism rampant at Columbia. To even try to say Dewey was in any way and individualist would at best be a stretch. Yes, there is a nexus to James, a sense of pragmatism in his philosophy, and his approach to epistemology was reasonable for its time, his political views, and individualism is as political as it is philosophical, is nowhere like what one would accept as true individualism.

On p 192 the author states:

“…Dewey is critical for understanding how pragmatism allows, and indeed requires, us to reconceive individualism. Of all the writers considered in the current study, Dewey articulates the most comprehensive critique of classic liberal individualism, as well as the most systematic argument why a reconstructed individualism is not merely compatible with, but essential to, a democratic ideal of community.”

This is truly a powerful statement and most telling. Yes indeed Dewey is a pragmatist, no one would deny that, but he is also in many ways a communitarian. The Dewey ideal of community would reject any form of individualism, it is more akin to Marxism, the individual disappears and the class remains. Nominalism would be rejected in this class based society, class as a conforming group not as a separatist set of associations. The author talks on p. 194 of a "trial by experience”. Indeed, individualism as exhibited in an entrepreneurial society, one where individuals are allowed to risk and if successful obtain rewards, as individuals, would in Dewey’s sense be subsumed into a group, a national pool of contributors to the whole.

On p 195 the author states:

“Dewey’s transactional model of selfhood leads him to reject the tired dualism of “individual” versus “institutional” approaches to reform, insisting instead that reform requires both the remaking of social conditions so as to instill new habits of individuality and the necessary role that individual imagination and choice play in so remaking social conditions.”

In a sense Dewey always saw “’society” as something moldable and the individual first fitting in that remolded society. One need just read Individualism Old and New by Dewey to fully understand his societal group think view.

Chapter 5 is about Dewey and reconstructing individualism. The bottom of p 245 has a most interesting statement:

“At the same time, the fact that an increasingly collective system of production has remained tied to an outdated system of individual property has alienated the vast majority of workers from meaningful control over and understanding the larger ends that direct their labor, thereby stripping their individuality of socially integrated meaning.”

This seems to be a Marxist view; society composed of classes, workers deprived of their due, and the individual must be subsumed under the integrated working class. The individual cannot exist except in the group of a socially properly structure society. This is hardly individualism as we understand it.

Then on p. 260 he states:

“An individualism that had at its core this goal of effective liberty and equality would seek, above all, to create social conditions that would afford all persons an equal opportunity to participate in the associated activities through which individual’s capacities are educated and liberated. So conceived, “individualism” describes an integral component of democracy considered as a way of life or the ideal community…”

This is total rejection of individualism and an acceptance of communitarian like systems. The author continues at length on p 261 a detailed discussion of this point. He believes society must structure the organizations to support individuals. He states:

“In an American context, be it Dewey’s of the 1930s or ours of today. proposals involving a significant degree of socialism are in danger of being pigeonholed, dismissed or vilified.”

Yes, because socialism is the very antithesis of individualism, of entrepreneurial societies, allowing free and open creative opportunities. I believe that here the author takes a clear and unambiguous position.

Chapter 6 deals with Ellison which I shall leave to the reader since I have no insight to him at all.

Now if one desires to understand individualism one need read many works which are available including Hayek, to name one. This book is in reality a socialist’s view of what they would like individualism to become; it in no way describes individualism.