Slightly Pregnant?

 One is or is not. There is no in between, unless it is some new woke phenomenon. Now a tactical nuclear weapon is exactly the same. A tactical weapon is 1 to 10 KT, about the size of Hiroshima. Now if that means anything to a younger generation it should mean the total destruction of a city. Buildings demolished, life as we know it gone in a flash for several mile radius. 

A tactical weapon is just a nice renaming of the basic element, a total death machine. It not only demolishes things, living and otherwise, but sends out radioactive clouds that spread their death elements across the planet. 

Yes a 50 MT weapon would destroy New York, a few dozen would destroy the planet. That is why they were never used. Back in the 70s it became clear to both sides that they only way to win is not to play that game. Somehow Putin and his ilk are playing with fire and they must be both clueless and willing to lose everything.

It really demands that someone stand and describe the horrors of these weapons and why their only use is not to be used. That someone has yet to be found, either in Washington or Moscow.

Gambling with Armageddon

Sherwin has written an interesting review of the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is in a sense a minute-by-minute summary of what occurred over the period with commentary on previous recollections and written reports. In a sense the author is attempting to set the record straight based upon new information and first-hand reports.

 The book is exhaustive in its coverage of the period but does preface it with the work leading to Hiroshima and the Eisenhower period of dealing with Soviet nuclear expansion.

 Overall, the book is expansive and details the interaction of the key players who make both assumptions and policy, often devoid of reality.

 In a sense the book is pro-Kennedy, with the exception of the slight interruptions of his “assistants”, Fiddle and Faddle, who seem to play some unstated role. One sees Kennedy dealing with the conflicting advice from his multiple advisors as well as having to deal with the generally pro-war military.

 For the most part the story has been told many times but there are several issues which it raises. First is the generally gross incompetence of the Intelligence community, the CIA, who after the Bay of Pigs fiasco seem to have just dug a deeper whole for themselves. The CIA seems to have continued its fumbling over an extensive period of time. Second is the Military Officers in command whose blatant dislike of the civilian leadership. Neither seemed to have served the American people well.

 The book does raise some serious issues:

 1.  Did the Executive and the Military have the faintest idea what damage could be brought by MT nuclear devices? No where in the discussion is there anyone telling Kennedy what may happen. These estimates were well known and circulated in DoD and the Executive. Millions of deaths would result in just a few seconds. These weapons would be 1,000 or more greater that Hiroshima (15KT),

 2. Why was there no psychological profiles of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders so that one could have some understanding on how to deal with them and moreover why they did what they did? Despite the alleged attempt by Kennedy to try to understand Khrushchev there did not seem to have been any detailed profiling of the individuals nor any attempt to understand why they were doing what they were. This was another defect at the CIA then and I suspect now.

 3. Why did no one in the US side even realize that if they tried to neutralize the nuclear sites there would always be one or more unseen which would then be launched? This I have called the “cancer surgeon metaphor”.  Namely the surgeon can remove what the surgeon sees, yet unseen malignant cells result in terminal metastasis. The author recalls the Rumsfeld comment of “Known knowns” etc. The author clearly indicates that Rumsfeld “folly” was his matrix of perception vs reality had four entries, and it was missing fourth the bit him.

 4. The “loose cannon” problem. This is the problem of having some low-level office in charge of deploying a nuclear weapon doing so on their own initiative. In Ellsberg recent book he details a multiplicity of these occasions. Namely launch authority could be accomplished well below the Executive.

 The author does and exceptionally good job in detailing the facts as are know and it is done in a highly logical and accessible manner. Very well worth the read.

Moreover, when one thinks of risks to humanity, nuclear weapons are number one. It is regrettable that politicians in general seem clueless as to the massive destruction of all life from just a few of these mega weapons.

NATO, Russia and Nuclear Weapons

Rand has issued an interesting study on the use of nuclear weapons in the event of Russian action in the Baltic. Among other things they note:

Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance.

 I have spent some time in these states and they generally are small, easily accessible along the Baltic, and abut  a small part of Poland, a larger section of Belarus, and on the east and west Russian territories.

Nuclear weapons are deadly, small or otherwise and their destructive potential are massive. The impact on surrounding countries and Russia itself would be horrendous.

Small yield tactical nukes have floated around US arsenals for decades.  These are 1-5 KT "clean" weapons useful for field applications against a massive Soviet tank attack. These alleged "clean" weapons still result in massive amounts of radioactive products, albeit of shorter lasting time. Yet destruction would be massive.

It is worth reading through this document to see where current US and Russian thinking could be. Perhaps speaking with the Russians to avoid "ambiguity of expectations" would help. In my prior experience in the 70s on the CTBT it was clear that both sides were terrified as regards t an all out nuclear war and in my almost decade long working with the Russians the old fear remained. New generations of planners may have yet to face the terror of such weapons. Perhaps now is a good time to rethink the approach.

Nuclear Threat

Despite the fact that we should not read RT or any Russia generated Internet postings, this one has merit. RT notes:

By training its European allies to use their nuclear arms, the US is moving towards an atomic war with Russia, forgetting that it would mean the end of the human civilization, retired Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky told RT. The US military is preparing the armed forces of the European countries for the use of tactical nukes against Russia, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said on Wednesday. He added that the presence of American non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is a major stumbling block in the path of disarmament. “No one can say how serious the threat really is” from the US actions, Buzhinsky, the Chairman of the Executive Board of the PIR-Center, said. However, he pointed out that “the military people are getting ready. The Russian military is preparing and the American military does the same. And it’s for the politicians to warn the public that such preparations are being made.”

 

As we have noted in our review of the  Ellsberg book, any nuclear attack would be world ending. Furthermore control of nuclear weapons must be tight. No surprises. If we want to argue against any proliferation in a rogue state such as Iran or PDRK then we must hold the reins ever so close ourselves. The Russians have a point. With the distribution amongst NATO allies we potentially create a deadly threat. A world ending threat!

Fault Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis is a fifty year plus old technique often mandated on sensitive systems. I used it in the 70s on certain nuclear weapons analyses. The approach it to document all the steps possible and then to assess what would happen if one or more were incorrectly performed, or failed, and then ascertain the consequence. Usually they could be dramatic in the nuclear field, so then you remedied the situation.

We always understood that "words mean something" so that we carefully tried to understand the commands and maker certain there was no ambiguity.

Now to the Hawaii fiasco. Clearly the state folks were clueless. But the consequences of that clueless behavior could have been devastating. The system needs a total overhaul, starting at the top, the very top. But politics being politics one just sees deflection. The discussion in ArsTechnica details the clear incompetence. They note:

It appears the employee who sent out the mobile and broadcast missile alert that sent Hawaii into a panic for 38 minutes on Saturday was supposed to choose "DRILL - PACOM (CDW) - STATE ONLY" but instead chose "PACOM (CDW) - STATE ONLY" from an unordered list of equally unintuitive and difficult-to-read options.

Think Fault Tree Analysis in broad scopes.

Incoming!

Now Pearl Harbor has a bit of a history for you millennials. There was this thing on December 7th 1941. You may not have covered it in your new history courses. But let us assume the Captain of the nuclear attack sub in Pearl is on the deck at 8 AM raising the port flag. His Chief Boatswain Mate tells him an alarm of an incoming ballistic missile strike has just been received from the State (See the NY Times). What do you think may happen. Think Peter Sellers! Dr Strangelove!

He cannot confirm but there is no way he is going to be stuck here when he has a belly filled with nukes. So, without hesitation he dives, and heads full steam, nuclear engines turning, out to sea, hopefully to survive and launch his full belly of 30 Mega Ton nukes at where ever! Yep, that could have happened. Thanks to our Government officials. Fortunately the Navy is not that bad, but....remember Peter Sellers.

Then again if an incoming 10 MT warhead explodes 5000 ft above Pearl you end up with two smaller islands. Duck and cover does not really work. Then you may also set off a volcano or two, a few massive earthquakes, a tsunami, and the list goes on. Perhaps we should better understand the total devastation of a single nuke!

Prior planning prevents poor performance, unless...

A Must Read on Nuclear Weapons

The Doomsday Machine by Ellsberg is an excellent introduction to the complexities of nuclear weapons and their deployment. Ellsberg covers the period of the 1960s, especially the first half, and the nature of the command and control of nuclear weapons deployment. His views were based upon his consulting as a RAND employee and having the ability to move in and around the multiplicity of players in this area. One may think that the President is the sole point of activation of a nuclear release but as Ellsberg so clearly shows the ability to deploy was and most likely still is diffused to the lowest levels.

Ellsberg depicts a Major in South Korea in charge of a bunch of nuclear armed F100s, all equipped with tactical but deadly nuclear bombs, who has taken it upon himself to determine when his pilots will deploy their weapons. Ellsberg also infers that the pilots themselves could even individually make the decision to deploy. Ellsberg does discuss the details of how a multiple F100 deployment may very well blow some of the F100s to shreds when the other have deployed due to the wide area blast effects.

The discussion of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) plans and the various attack options that the US had developed. In contrast he does not discuss the Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP) plan which is a counter to SIOP. Yet his discussion of the military and its nonchalant acceptance of 100 million casualties, namely deaths, was typical of military planner during this period. He does a superb job in characterizing the mindset of the planners and those in command regarding their near comfort in seeing just 100 million dead Americans as long as they could exterminate a larger number of Russians and Chinese.

Ellsberg's telling of this situation and in this time frame is unique because he was at the level of an observer, having no political gain to be made, being at RAND and being but a consultant, albeit one with extraordinary access.

Ellsberg does spend a reasonable amount of space on the issues of limiting nuclear weapons especially first strike capabilities. However as he had already detailed first strike management could already be out of the hands of an President. In fact the President, who may think he or she has the "button" may be circumvented by some field commander, or worse, by a single pilot or sub commander. The movie Fail Safe startled Ellsberg by its reality. Worse was that it portrayed a Doomsday Machine which would only deter if the other side was aware of it.

To a degree, my time on nuclear weapons was a decade later than Ellsberg, ironically my first day after my PhD was the day Ellsberg's material hit the NY Times. Coming from MIT, and Ellsberg then being at MIT, I was looked at a bit askance. Yet over the next decade as I became involved in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, especially during the Carter period, it was clear that the only way to use a nuclear weapon was not to use a nuclear weapon. The RISOP scenarios showed the annihilation of life on the planet. There was no way to win, first strike or otherwise. A Russian and US nuclear war was the destruction of all. Ironically in my later discussions with my Russian partners after the fall it was clear that they too understood this, positioning or not.

The risk is a rogue player, one who can really push the button. That perhaps is more of a reality today than during the 60s and 70s. Ellsberg's book is a must read for anyone interested in the nuclear debate, a debate whose only solution in my opinion is not to use the device.

Nuclear Buttons

As of now, we have but a few students who may recall from their Second Year Latin:

Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? quam diu etiam furor iste tuus nos1 eludet? quem ad finem sese effrenata iactabit audacia? nihilne te nocturnum praesidium Palati, nihil urbis vigiliae, nihil timor populi, nihil concursus bonorum omnium, nihil hic munitissimus habendi senatus locus, nihil horum ora voltusque moverunt?

The Oration Against Cataline by Cicero. Needless to say Marcus Tulius had less than an amicable ending. But Gary Wills interjects Marcus in his piece on Executive Power. It appears age creeps up on all of us. But I digress. Wills notes[1]:

The assumptions that Congress made about the conduct of President Eisenhower or President Reagan—that they could be counted on to act with humble precaution—no longer seem to apply. What can be done? There comes a time when, as Cicero put it, “The highest law should be preservation of the people,” Salus populi suprema lex esto. A crisis sufficient to justify use of this maxim cannot be predicted. It could be any first nuclear strike the president may order. Only extreme peril can justify an extreme remedy. It is said (I don’t know with what truth) that in 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told the implementers that in the event of a nuclear order from President Nixon, who was in a massive drunken funk, they should clear it with him. We can only hope that there are high-ranking patriots who might act like that if Big Rocket Man went after Little Rocket Man. Even a soldier in the field must disobey a truly disastrous order from a manifestly disabled officer. The commander in chief has to be held to the same standard as his subordinate commanders, for the preservation of the people. It is reassuring to know that the current commander of the US Strategic Command, Air Force General John Hyten, as well as a former one, General Robert Kehler, recognizes this as a rule of international law.

The problem here has in the past been one of neither side launching a nuclear attack, period. The sides were the US and the USSR. By the mid-1970s the consequences of a nuclear attack were seen by both sides as totally devastating making Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, the only strategy to avoid. Back in the 60s we had RISOP:

The U.S. military has canceled the Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP), a hypothetical Russian nuclear strike plan against the United States created and used for decades by U.S. nuclear war planners to improve U.S. nuclear strike plans against Russia.

I recall one Plan, RISOP 9B, which assured the end of existence for all creatures on the planet! I recall when I was involved in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations in the late 70s having casual discussions with my Russian counterparts who also knew the consequences. There was a rational set of players on both sides. The very fact that we had the ability for a second strike, and a third if necessary, as did the Soviets, made both sides think. Clearly President Carter knew, as a Naval Officer on a Nuclear Sub, you had a key, and you also knew the consequences.

Does our current President know? Perhaps the question is; is there any parallel between the USSR and North Korea or Iran? The Russians and me and my colleagues could speak os or children and grandchildren. We saw a future, and despite differences we had them over politics, not religion or worse, not in the case of a putative mad man. Could we enter a nuclear war with Russia, doubtful, with China, doubtful, but the other two may readily launch a nuclear attack.

Thus, what do we do? One assumes that like RISOP 9B we have plans. A single nuke launched at San Francisco could be intercepted, hopefully. Then what? Or on the other hand do we consider a pre-emptive strike? If so, is it nuclear? We have a multiplicity of tactical nukes, some 1-5 KT yield with fairly clean radiation after effects, but if we did not use them after 9-11 then we would be hard pressed here. Nukes are nukes.

But one method of deterrence is uncertainty of the response by the other side, especially if the response could be overwhelming. Taking that uncertainty away then emboldens the adversary. That uncertainty is the most powerful of weapons. It costs nothing and does no damage short term. But what if it does not work? What if the adversary is just plain nuts? What if they do launch an attack? That is the real question.

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[1] http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/12/21/big-rocket-man/