Sherwin has written an interesting review of the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is in a sense a minute-by-minute summary of what occurred over the period with commentary on previous recollections and written reports. In a sense the author is attempting to set the record straight based upon new information and first-hand reports.
The book is exhaustive in its coverage of the period but does preface it with the work leading to Hiroshima and the Eisenhower period of dealing with Soviet nuclear expansion.
Overall, the book is expansive and details the interaction of the key players who make both assumptions and policy, often devoid of reality.
In a sense the book is pro-Kennedy, with the exception of the slight interruptions of his “assistants”, Fiddle and Faddle, who seem to play some unstated role. One sees Kennedy dealing with the conflicting advice from his multiple advisors as well as having to deal with the generally pro-war military.
For the most part the story has been told many times but there are several issues which it raises. First is the generally gross incompetence of the Intelligence community, the CIA, who after the Bay of Pigs fiasco seem to have just dug a deeper whole for themselves. The CIA seems to have continued its fumbling over an extensive period of time. Second is the Military Officers in command whose blatant dislike of the civilian leadership. Neither seemed to have served the American people well.
The book does raise some serious issues:
1. Did the Executive and the Military have the faintest idea what damage could be brought by MT nuclear devices? No where in the discussion is there anyone telling Kennedy what may happen. These estimates were well known and circulated in DoD and the Executive. Millions of deaths would result in just a few seconds. These weapons would be 1,000 or more greater that Hiroshima (15KT),
2. Why was there no psychological profiles of Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders so that one could have some understanding on how to deal with them and moreover why they did what they did? Despite the alleged attempt by Kennedy to try to understand Khrushchev there did not seem to have been any detailed profiling of the individuals nor any attempt to understand why they were doing what they were. This was another defect at the CIA then and I suspect now.
3. Why did no one in the US side even realize that if they tried to neutralize the nuclear sites there would always be one or more unseen which would then be launched? This I have called the “cancer surgeon metaphor”. Namely the surgeon can remove what the surgeon sees, yet unseen malignant cells result in terminal metastasis. The author recalls the Rumsfeld comment of “Known knowns” etc. The author clearly indicates that Rumsfeld “folly” was his matrix of perception vs reality had four entries, and it was missing fourth the bit him.
4. The “loose cannon” problem. This is the problem of having some low-level office in charge of deploying a nuclear weapon doing so on their own initiative. In Ellsberg recent book he details a multiplicity of these occasions. Namely launch authority could be accomplished well below the Executive.
The author does and exceptionally good job in detailing the facts as are know and it is done in a highly logical and accessible manner. Very well worth the read.
Moreover, when one thinks of risks to humanity, nuclear weapons are number one. It is regrettable that politicians in general seem clueless as to the massive destruction of all life from just a few of these mega weapons.
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