Are you out of your mind!

 The Guardian notes that Leo XIV announces that Leo "opens the doors" for Ukraine and Russia can negotiate at the Vatican. Someone must have forgotten about history. The Guardian notes:

Pope Leo confirmed to Giorgia Meloni his willingness to host in the Vatican the next round of negotiations to try to end the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Italian prime minister said on Tuesday. “Finding in the Holy Father confirmation of the readiness to host the next talks between the parties in the Vatican, the prime minister expressed deep gratitude to Pope Leo XIV for his unceasing commitment to peace,” said a statement from Meloni. Leo, elected two weeks ago, said on 14 May that the Vatican could act as a mediator in global conflicts, without specifically mentioning Russia’s war against Ukraine.

 Now the Russian Patriarch in Moscow has unbroken lineage from the earlier Patriarchs in history. Unlike the Patriarch, the Bishop of Rome, AKA the Pope, has a massively disrupted lineage. There have been multiple Popes, Anti Popes, heretical popes, and of course the Borgias! Hardly the most sanctified lineage. For example John XII, an Avignon Bishop of Rome, never having set a foot in Rome, was declared a heretic! One of many. The list of issues is endless.

Thus to consider Putin, relying on the support of the Patriarch in Moscow, to entertain the kindness of Leo seems ate first glance to be a dunderheaded step by one oblivious of history. It would be akin of some grand Mullah to agree to negotiate under the auspices of the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem!

This was dead from the get go. But more importantly it shows how little the West even tries to understand Russia. It shows further that such lack of understanding leads to hostility. 

Why Does Someone Publicly Blow Up a Negotiation?

 I have negotiated hundreds of negotiations over the years. I learned a great deal in the 70s with various negotiations where I was a mere observer. By the 80s I was now negotiating, at Warner and then when I started to do investments with "turn arounds". I always wanted something as did the other side. By the early 2000s I became a "dream merchant" in that I saw what the other side wanted and managed to align my needs with theirs. Always give and take and always non-confrontational.

In the late 90s when dealing with my Eastern European partners I learned to sense their un-sensed concerns. Russian a different negotiators. I had a Ukrainian General, interesting but not as strong as Russians. 

I was at times exposed to the Press and once made a comment that got to my European investors in less than 12 hours, and I was pummeled by saying something that was not well received. Simply I compared Silicon Valley VCs with Zurich banks. It was true but I learned that Zurich banks do not like ever being mentioned, especially in public. I learned, I recovered, and the lesson is never ever speak of your potential partners even making what one thinks of as a truism. 

Now this gets to Zelensky. One wonders why he did what he did. Some thoughts:

1. He is just a bumbling idiot. Possible, but unlikely.

2. He was told that this was the way to deal with the President?  Very possible. He may have been "advised" that to get what he wanted he should have the Press intervene.

3. He did not expect anything from the President but wanted to raise support from Europeans who saw him standing up to the President. Likely, but the idea most likely came from elsewhere. The problem is that the only strong player in Europe is Poland, the rest have old decaying military and crumbling economies. Just look at the UK, France, Germany. 

4. He feared a peace settlement wherein he lost territory and just wants the war to continue with him as head. Possible, but the war is unwinnable. 

We can continue but we should return to the question; why did Putin start this whole thing in the first place? Did Putin want to take over Ukraine, did he have bad intelligence, was there an assumption that the Ukrainian President would fold, that the US would not respond and so forth. Did the CIA have a clue? If so what did the White House do?

 In a sense this seems to have been a combined Intel failure and Executive failure. But what was it really? Still an open question.

Russia, Ukraine, the US

 

I started to learn Russian in the Summer of 1961 when I was a Lifeguard in NYC Beaches. My helper was a Ukrainian immigrant Lifeguard who would help me in pronunciation. Little did I know but my pronunciation and even words would later betray me as Ukrainian taught. But that is a tale for later. In 1961 Russia was our biggest enemy. It would take another year to get to the Cuban Missile Crisis but clearly 1961 was a nuclear threat environment.

 In the late 60s at MIT I took Russian in my foreign language requirement, by then you had a dictionary and all you needed to do was translate a technical paper abstract. I got through.

 In the early 70s I got involved in some [politics in what was then the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a right wing Democrat organization which later became the Neo Cons. In the process I had the opportunity to work with Professor Richar Pipes, and got educated on Russia, its history, and the current Russian threats.

 By the late 70s I was seconded to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, with the Soviets. I had several meetings with the Russians and even attended receptions in the Soviet Embassy.

 In the early 1990s I went to St Petersburg, just as it was opening up. The old Soviet styles still lingered. We stayed in an Intourist (KGB) hotel and since I had a modest facility in Russian managed to see the city that most westerners missed. I saw ballets for $0.50 whereas the other westerners paid $50.00! My Russia was workable and my attire was not classic western.

 By the mid-1990s I started my international company with a Polish partner and an émigré Russia associate. Off to Moscow. Not as some American executive, but again as a bit of a man in the shadows. No ego, not American attitude. Luckily my wife was a Russophile, Czarist era, and when my Russian partners (most former KGB) took her on a tour of the Kremlin, she could explain all the paintings and history. For a moment people though her as a tour guide and praised her for her English! My Russian partners were impressed.

 Thus for almost ten years I worked with them, 1996 to 2005. We parted friends and I still get annual birthday greetings from Moscow!

 As for Ukraine, I had dealt with many Ukrainians and even went to Lvov to examine the Soviet satellite earth station.

 The current state of Russian and American relations are in my opinion and my experience a result of American overstepping. It started with the American academics telling the Russian how to do business. They did so with no understanding of Russia and its culture. The result was a disaster. Then they expanded NATO, while Russia was just trying to develop a stable economy. The Russian dreadfully fear threats on their borders. Thus as NATO expanded so did the internal fears of Russia. However if one looks at the Baltic States and especially Poland one sees reasonable concerns, thus NATO could be justified but was seen as a threat to Russia. From these two issues; the economy and the border security, came Putin.

 Putin is clearly former KGB. I had run across an East German STASI operative who was his counterpart. She made Putin understandable. Also it was clear that he harbored a dread of the West and a bubbling anger over the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus the short steel eyed Slav evolved into what we see today.

 Now as to Ukraine. It always had some separate stance especially the Western part. The Ukrainian in the west is akin to Polish whereas in the East is Russian. Just thinks of “thank you”. Thus borders were always somewhat flexible.

 Now come to the current fiasco in the White House. First think of Churchill and Roosevelt. Think Lend Lease. Churchill came hat in hand and understood how to deal with FDR. He was prepped by MI6 as regards to FDRs mannerisms, how to approach him, how to cajole and persuade. Churchill was a quintessential salesman. He got what he needed. In contrast the current Ukrainian President came demanding and complaining and clearly lacked any understanding of the current US President. One suspects he may have been told but his own arrogance could not accept the advice. Churchill dressed appropriately, the Ukrainian did not.

 Understanding the current US President dictates a style of communications which many other foreign leaders have understood. Letters from a King gets one a good trade deal. Hugs from the French assures low tariffs. It does not take much. But scolding anyone in front of the Press gets one the door, permanently.

 The question then for the US is; do we still have productive issues to discuss with Russia? Clearly the current president and the DOGE head are no Nixon and Kissinger, but there can be an argument made. Also we import nothing from Russia, except minerals such as vanadium, critical in our fighter aircraft.

 Thus what can we expect for the next steps? The US wants to try to neutralize the Russia/China/Iran axis. We have no means to deal with Iran. China is a real problem under the current leaders. Russia feels it “just gets no respect”. Thus, the Kissinger strategic mindset needs to become available; one should think strategically and one who can work the ego of the President.

 But the controlling conditions the US must deal with are; (i) Ukraine cannot joint NATO, it would be seen as an existential threat to Moscow, (ii) Ukraine is now a force amalgam of east and west. Perhaps the demands are that the east which is predominantly Russia become such, (iii) the notion of “peacekeepers” is fraught with peril, (iv) the current Ukrainian president seems committed to continuing the battle, it is clearly a no win situation, and how does this get resolved, (v) the US has a limited strategic interest, proxy wars never end well, (vi) the US should engage Russia independent of Ukraine. Fortunately the current Ukrainian president has facilitated many of these. But we still need a Kissinger.

Vulnerable Cables

 

The BBC notes:

Yemen's legitimate, UN-recognised government in Aden has warned that the Houthis, who seized much of Yemen in 2014, are now threatening to sabotage the crucial undersea communication cables, including internet lines, which run under the Red Sea - connecting Asia to Europe.The warning came after a channel linked to the Houthis on the Telegram messaging app posted a map showing undersea cable routes in the Red Sea.Could the Houthis sabotage these lines? They almost certainly would if they could.The group has reportedly claimed that they have easily accessed maps showing the confluence of undersea communications cables running past their coastline, as they pass through the Bab al-Mandab Strait which, at its narrowest, is just 20 miles (32km) wide.

 (See Maps)

Yes, this is a real problem. However, Russia has facilities across the Arctic that connect St Petersburg to Nahodka. That being the case the West would be at the mercy of Russia for Eastbound traffic. Pacific Westbound would still function but India would be in trouble. Again see above Maps reference.

 

By the way, all it requires is a fishing trawler, an anchor, a map and GPS. Cheap and it is game over!

The Polish (Ukraine) Question

 In Rosa Luxemburg's writing she addresses the Polish Question as follows (see Rosa Luxemburg, The Polish Question)

 Progress is evident in every regard, and many aspects of the working-class struggle look quite different from the way they did thirty-two years ago. But the essential element in this entire development lies in the following: from a sect of ideologues, socialists have grown into a major unified party capable of handling its own affairs. Then, they barely existed in isolated little groups outside the mainstream of political life in every country; today, they represent the dominant factor in the life of society.

 This is particularly true in the major civilized countries; but in every country they are an element to be taken seriously and to be reckoned with at every step by government and ruling class alike. Then, it was a question of merely spreading the new message; today, the paramount question is how the struggle of the vast popular masses, now thoroughly imbued with the gospel of socialism, can best be led toward its goal.

 The International Workers' Congress has undergone corresponding changes. In its beginning, the International was more of a council that met to formulate the basic principles of the new movement; today, it is primarily, even exclusively, a body for practical deliberations by the conscious proletariat on the urgent questions of its day to day struggle.

 All tasks and objectives are here subjected to rigorous evaluation as to their practicability; those, however, that appear to exceed the forces of the proletariat are laid aside, regardless of how attractive or appealing they may sound. This is the essential difference between the conference this year in St. Martin's Hall and the one that took place thirty-two years ago, and it is from this perspective that the resolution laid before the Congress must be examined.

 The resolution on the restoration of Poland to be presented at the London Congress reads as follows.

 "Whereas, the subjugation of one nation by another can serve only the interests of capitalists and despots, while for working people in both oppressed and oppressor nation it is equally pernicious; and whereas, in particular, the Russian tsardom, which owes its internal strength and its external significance to the subjugation and partition of Poland, constitutes a permanent threat to the development of the international workers' movement, the Congress hereby resolves: that the independence of Poland represents an imperative political demand both for the Polish proletariat and for the international labor movement as a whole."

 The demand for the political independence of Poland is supported by two arguments: first, the general perniciousness of annexations from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat; and second, the special significance of the subjugation of Poland for the continued existence of the Russian tsardom, and thus, by implication, the significance of Polish independence for its downfall. Let us take the second point first. The Russian tsardom derives neither its inner strength nor its external significance from the subjugation of Poland. This assertion in the resolution is false from A to Z.

 The Russian tsardom derives its inner strength from the social relations within Russia itself. The historical basis of Russian absolutism is a natural economy resting on the archaic communal- property relations of the peasantry.

 The remains of this backward social structure-and there are many such remains still to be found in Russia today-along with the total configuration of other social factors, constitute the basis of the Russian tsardom. The nobility is kept under the tsar's thumb by an endless flow of handouts paid for by taxing the peasantry. Foreign policy is conducted to benefit the bourgeoisie with the opening of new markets as its main objective, while customs policy puts the Russian consumer at the mercy of the manufacturers. Finally, even the domestic activity of the tsardom is in the service of capital: the organization of industrial expositions, the construction of the Siberian railroad, and other projects of a similar nature are all carried out with a view to advancing the interests of capitalism. In general, under the tsardom the bourgeoisie plays an inordinately important role in shaping domestic and foreign policy, a role which its numerical inconsequence would never permit it to play without the tsar. This, then, is the combination of factors which gives the tsardom its strength internally.

 So it continues to vegetate, because the obsolete social forms have not yet completely disappeared, and the embryonic class relations of a modern society have not yet fully developed and crystallized. Again: the strength of the tsardom abroad derives not from the partition of Poland, but from the particular features of the Russian Empire. Its vast human masses provide an unlimited source of financial and military resources, available almost on command, which elevates Russia to the level of a first-rate European power. Its vastness and geographic position give Russia a very special interest in the Eastern question, in which it vies with the other nations that are also involved in that part of the world.

 At the same time, Russia borders on the British possessions in Asia, which is leading it toward an inevitable confrontation with England. In Europe, too, Russia is deeply involved in the most vital concerns of the European powers. Especially in the nineteenth century, the revolutionary class struggles just now emerging have put the tsardom in the role of guardian of reaction in Europe, which fact also contributes to its stature abroad.

 But above all, in speaking of Russia's foreign position, especially over the last few decades, it is not the partition of Poland but solely and exclusively the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine that lends it its power: by dividing Europe into two hostile camps, by creating a permanent threat of war, and by driving France further and further into the arms of Russia. From false premises come false conclusions: as if the existence of an independent Poland could deprive Russia of its powers at home or abroad.

 The restoration of Poland could bring about the downfall of Russian absolutism only if it simultaneously abolished the social basis of the tsardom within Russia itself, i.e., the remains of the old peasant economy and the importance of the tsardom for both the nobility and the bourgeoisie. But of course this is arrant nonsense: it makes no difference-with or without Poland these relations remain unchanged.

 The hope of breaking the hold of Russian omnipotence through the restoration of Poland is an anachronism stemming from that bygone time when there seemed to be no hope that forces within Russia itself would ever be capable of  achieving the destruction of the tsardom. The Russia of that time, a land of natural economy, seemed, as did all such countries, to be mired in total social stagnation. But since the sixties it has set a course toward the development of a modern economy and in so doing has sown the seeds for a solution to the problem of Russian absolutism.

 The tsardom finds itself forced to support a capitalist economy, but in so doing it is sawing off the limb on which it sits. Through its financial policies it is destroying whatever remains of the old agricultural-communal relationships, and is thus eliminating any basis for conservative modes of thought among the peasantry. What is more, in its plundering of the peasantry, the tsardom is undermining its own material foundations and destroying the resources with which it purchased the loyalty of the nobility.

 Finally, the tsardom has apparently made it its special task to ruin the major class of consumers at the bourgeoisie's expense, thus leaving with its pockets empty the very class to whose pecuniary interests it sacrificed the interests of the nation as a whole. Once a useful agent of the bourgeois economy, the ponderous bureaucracy has become its fetters. The result is the accelerated growth of the industrial proletariat, the one social force with which the tsardom cannot ally itself and to which it cannot give ground without jeopardizing its own existence. These, then, are the social contradictions whose solution involves the downfall of absolutism. The tsardom is driving forward to that fatal moment like a rolling stone on a steep hill. The hill is the development of capitalism, and at its foot the iron fists of the working class are waiting.  

Replace Poland with Ukraine and the Tsar with Putin and we get an interesting parallel.  History has a way or repeating itself again and again. It is a shame that so few people remember it or are even the slightest bit aware.

Stalin and Ukraine

 We continue with Stalin's view of nations and specifically Ukraine where Stalin writes:

The Concept of "Nation" Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others, March 18, 1929, Stalin, Joseph. Selected Works: Volume 1 (p. 787). Prism Key Press. Kindle Edition.

 The Russian Marxists have long had their theory of the nation. According to this theory, a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. This theory, as we know, has received general recognition in our Party. It is evident from your letters that you consider this theory inadequate. You therefore propose that the four characteristics of a nation be supplemented by a fifth, namely, that a nation possesses its own, separate national state. You consider that there is not and cannot be a nation unless this fifth characteristic is present. I think that the scheme you propose, with its new, fifth characteristic of the concept "nation," is profoundly mistaken and cannot be justified either theoretically or in practice, politically.

 According to your scheme, only such nations are to be recognised as nations as have their own state, separate from others, whereas all oppressed nations which have no independent statehood would have to be deleted from the category of nations; moreover, the struggle of oppressed nations against national oppression and the struggle of colonial peoples against imperialism would have to be excluded from the concept "national movement" and "national-liberation movement."

 More than that. According to your scheme we would have to assert:

 a) that the Irish became a nation only after the formation of the "Irish Free State," and that before that they did not constitute a nation;

 b) that the Norwegians were not a nation before Norway's secession from Sweden, and became a nation only after that secession;

 c) that the Ukrainians were not a nation when the Ukraine formed part of tsarist Russia; that they became a nation only after they seceded from Soviet Russia under the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, but again ceased to be a nation after they united their Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the other Soviet Republics to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

 A great many such examples could be cited. Obviously, a scheme which leads to such absurd conclusions cannot be regarded as a scientific scheme. In practice, politically, your scheme inevitably leads to the justification of national, imperialist oppression, whose exponents emphatically refuse to recognise as real nations oppressed and unequal nations which have no separate national state of their own, and consider that this circumstance gives them the right to oppress these nations.

 That is apart from the fact that your scheme provides a justification for the bourgeois nationalists in our Soviet Republics who argue that the Soviet nations ceased to be nations when they agreed to unite their national Soviet Republics into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

 That is how matters stand with regard to "supplementing" and "amending" the Russian Marxist theory of the nation. Only one thing remains, and that is to admit that the Russian Marxist theory of the nation is the only correct theory.

Ukraine was and remained an independent nation albeit aligned with the Soviet in Russia. It is clear that even for the butcher Stalin Ukraine was both a nation and independent. The loss of nationhood for Ukraine was a result of the Tsar, which in this case becomes Putin.