The Doomsday Machine by Ellsberg is an excellent
introduction to the complexities of nuclear weapons and their deployment. Ellsberg
covers the period of the 1960s, especially the first half, and the nature of
the command and control of nuclear weapons deployment. His views were based
upon his consulting as a RAND employee and having the ability to move in and
around the multiplicity of players in this area. One may think that the
President is the sole point of activation of a nuclear release but as Ellsberg
so clearly shows the ability to deploy was and most likely still is diffused to
the lowest levels.
Ellsberg depicts a Major in South Korea in charge of a bunch
of nuclear armed F100s, all equipped with tactical but deadly nuclear bombs,
who has taken it upon himself to determine when his pilots will deploy their
weapons. Ellsberg also infers that the pilots themselves could even individually
make the decision to deploy. Ellsberg does discuss the details of how a
multiple F100 deployment may very well blow some of the F100s to shreds when
the other have deployed due to the wide area blast effects.
The discussion of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational
Plan) plans and the various attack options that the US had developed. In
contrast he does not discuss the Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan
(RISOP) plan which is a counter to SIOP. Yet his discussion of the military and
its nonchalant acceptance of 100 million casualties, namely deaths, was typical
of military planner during this period. He does a superb job in characterizing
the mindset of the planners and those in command regarding their near comfort
in seeing just 100 million dead Americans as long as they could exterminate a
larger number of Russians and Chinese.
Ellsberg's telling of this situation and in this time frame
is unique because he was at the level of an observer, having no political gain
to be made, being at RAND and being but a consultant, albeit one with
extraordinary access.
Ellsberg does spend a reasonable amount of space on the
issues of limiting nuclear weapons especially first strike capabilities.
However as he had already detailed first strike management could already be out
of the hands of an President. In fact the President, who may think he or she
has the "button" may be circumvented by some field commander, or
worse, by a single pilot or sub commander. The movie Fail Safe startled
Ellsberg by its reality. Worse was that it portrayed a Doomsday Machine which
would only deter if the other side was aware of it.
To a degree, my time on nuclear weapons was a decade later
than Ellsberg, ironically my first day after my PhD was the day Ellsberg's
material hit the NY Times. Coming from MIT, and Ellsberg then being at MIT, I
was looked at a bit askance. Yet over the next decade as I became involved in
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, especially during the Carter period, it was
clear that the only way to use a nuclear weapon was not to use a nuclear
weapon. The RISOP scenarios showed the annihilation of life on the planet.
There was no way to win, first strike or otherwise. A Russian and US nuclear
war was the destruction of all. Ironically in my later discussions with my
Russian partners after the fall it was clear that they too understood this,
positioning or not.
The risk is a rogue player, one who can really push the
button. That perhaps is more of a reality today than during the 60s and 70s.
Ellsberg's book is a must read for anyone interested in the nuclear debate, a
debate whose only solution in my opinion is not to use the device.
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