The NY Times is advocating for a new tunnel under the Hudson. As they state:
The only long-term solution is the construction of a new tunnel complex, as proposed by Amtrak in its Gateway Program.
Without a new tunnel and new rail tracks, a massive storm or some other
disaster could sever a critical link in the Northeast rail corridor
that serves more than 750,000 people a day on 2,000 intercity and
commuter trains. For commuters and rail passengers crossing the Hudson
River who are already complaining about delays, it can only get worse.
That is giving Amtrak from the Feds and States the money to build the tunnel. But I remember the first time I took a cab from the new Hong Kong airport through the new tunnel, a privately owned and financed tunnel. It was built in a very short time period, cost the Hong Kong taxpayers nothing, and was paid by those who used it.
Why not try that one. I use the train to Penn Station whenever I get to the city. The old facilities are rally falling apart and need replacement. But Government does not seem to work, especially Amtrak. So why not emulate the Chinese, it works.
Monday, August 17, 2015
More Thoughts of Kennan: Russia and/or Iran
George Kennan in his lecture on American Diplomacy articulated a path to dealing with the USSR, in fact Russia. The following summarizes his view:
But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the ·revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the ·lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plan. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualms; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it-does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there_ should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.
These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and 'vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with' outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
The key elements are that the Russians have a different view of time and we must let them preserve their prestige. Nothing has changed. Yet does this in any way apply to Iran, Persia in a historical context. The true issue is; does the United States today have a diplomatic core capable of having this discussion or have we politicized the extreme political tendencies of the State Department even further.
The US State Department has not always been the bastion of clever strategic thinking. Hay and the Open Door policy may have very well set the stage for Pearl Harbor. The State Department closed the doors to the Jews in the 30s. The list goes on. The problem now is that Executive Agreements can be cut that are not Treaties yet have significant influence. One wonders if we have any more Kennans.
But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the ·revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the ·lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plan. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualms; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it-does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there_ should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.
These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and 'vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with' outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
The key elements are that the Russians have a different view of time and we must let them preserve their prestige. Nothing has changed. Yet does this in any way apply to Iran, Persia in a historical context. The true issue is; does the United States today have a diplomatic core capable of having this discussion or have we politicized the extreme political tendencies of the State Department even further.
The US State Department has not always been the bastion of clever strategic thinking. Hay and the Open Door policy may have very well set the stage for Pearl Harbor. The State Department closed the doors to the Jews in the 30s. The list goes on. The problem now is that Executive Agreements can be cut that are not Treaties yet have significant influence. One wonders if we have any more Kennans.
Ockham versus the Scholastics
Friedman’s book, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, is an
exceptionally accessible work discussing the complex issue of the Christian
concept of the Trinity. Many of the early heresies in the Christian Church
dealt with what was interpreted as false views on what the Trinity was. The
complexity of the Trinity is driven by the acceptance of Jesus as God but also
man and the incorporation of the Holy Spirit as a separate manifestation of
God. The former was a result of the acceptance of the four Gospels, especially
that of John and the latter the acceptance of the Acts of Paul. The complexity
was further complicated by the inclusion of Greek philosophical thought and
terms of philosophical understanding that became the tools to make this
interpretation.
It was left to Augustine to lay for the Western Church a
foundation that lasted almost a millennium until Aquinas delved into the
process again in the 13th Century. To some degree the development
ends as so many of these pursuits with Ockham. Ockham rejects the Academics and
states that one can accept the Trinity sola fide, on faith alone. It is
Ockham who introduces the concepts of Nominalism, the importance and
criticality of the individual, the ability to rely on faith, and of course his
accusation of heresy to the Pope in Avignon.
The Aquinas versus Ockham debate is first framed as the
Dominican versus Franciscan debate. In Chapter 1 the author in the clearest of
terms describes the debate. Here we have the Dominicans trying to rely on
Aristotelean constructs and speak of the Trinity as a familiar set of
relationships. The Franciscans take a more ethereal approach and lay out the emanation
approach. It is Ockham, a Franciscan, who takes the ultimate extreme of
rejecting both and stating that faith alone carries the day. This is a
brilliantly written Chapter, one of the best I have seen addressing this
debate. It may have been improved if it has a preface discussing Augustine a
bit more and also the early Church debates, but that in no way detracts from
the presentation.
Chapter 2 discusses the Psychological Model, or as the
author states on pp 50-51 that the Son is literally the Concept of the Father
and the Holy Spirit is the Love produced by the will shared by the Father and
the Son. The author clearly explains the evolution of this approach via John’s
Gospel and the use of the term logos. In Latin the term is verbum and yet there
may be a slight but material difference between the two terms. There is a brief
integration of the Augustine thought on this approach.
Chapter 3 discusses the Trinity and Metaphysical thought.
Chapter 4 is a key chapter; it introduces Ockham and sola fide. This is an
especially clear and well written presentation. The author examines Gilson, the
French Neo-Scholastic, and presents a well-structured Gilsonian analysis and
contrasts it to Ockham. Whereas Gilson is a Thomist, and Thomism has persevered
in classic Catholicism, the Ockham school does lend itself to a bifurcation of
Scholastic approach into one that faith exists and can play a vital role to
that attempt to use reason to explain all the nuances introduced in the New
Testament.
Overall I would highly recommend this exceptional book.
Although it deals with a highly complex and specialized issued, it does so
fairly and in a quite readable manner. It is not a classic heavy tome of Scholastic
formalism but a clearly articulated discussion of a core principle of Christin
belief.
Sunday, August 16, 2015
Let the Sales Begin!
China Daily reports that it is negotiating sales of an F 16 knockoff to Iran in anticipation of the deal.
As they state:
The China-made J-10 multi-role fighter jet is a suitable choice for Iran if the Middle East power decides to upgrade its aging military aircraft fleet, Chinese aviation experts said. "Once the sanctions against Iran are completely lifted, the country will definitely renovate its civilian and military aircraft fleets. The J-10 is a good option for the Iranians because it can fulfill all operations they want to conduct," said Wang Ya'nan, deputy editor-in-chief of Aerospace Knowledge magazine. "In addition to air combat, our J-10 is also capable of performing air-to-surface strikes and anti-ship operations," he added. "Moreover, the Iranians must have known that China, among other major weapon exporters, is the most reliable supplier when it comes to arms deals. China is also very flexible in payment issues."
Thus the immediacy to see the market opportunity and arm Iran is at the top of the list of advantages of this deal. The idea of unintended consequences may not have been fully appreciated!
One should read and re-read Kennan's short work, American Diplomacy, and better understand all the mistakes the US has made over the years.
Having been a small part of the CTBT during the Carter period, verification of compliance is essential. Second is consequences to violations. Verification here appears to be near zero, since one could not tell until after an explosion.
As they state:
The China-made J-10 multi-role fighter jet is a suitable choice for Iran if the Middle East power decides to upgrade its aging military aircraft fleet, Chinese aviation experts said. "Once the sanctions against Iran are completely lifted, the country will definitely renovate its civilian and military aircraft fleets. The J-10 is a good option for the Iranians because it can fulfill all operations they want to conduct," said Wang Ya'nan, deputy editor-in-chief of Aerospace Knowledge magazine. "In addition to air combat, our J-10 is also capable of performing air-to-surface strikes and anti-ship operations," he added. "Moreover, the Iranians must have known that China, among other major weapon exporters, is the most reliable supplier when it comes to arms deals. China is also very flexible in payment issues."
Thus the immediacy to see the market opportunity and arm Iran is at the top of the list of advantages of this deal. The idea of unintended consequences may not have been fully appreciated!
One should read and re-read Kennan's short work, American Diplomacy, and better understand all the mistakes the US has made over the years.
Having been a small part of the CTBT during the Carter period, verification of compliance is essential. Second is consequences to violations. Verification here appears to be near zero, since one could not tell until after an explosion.
Russia, The Telegram, Kennan: Then and Now
From time to time it is worth re-reading Kennan's "Telegram" on Russia, then it was the Soviet Union, and ask what has changed; players or roles, or nothing?
On February 22, 1946 Kennan wrote:
At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
On February 22, 1946 Kennan wrote:
At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
Perhaps this applies quite well today. Russia today, albeit becoming more main stream, is still stuck in a Czarist state of strong rulers and limited outwardness.
He continues:
In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.
In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.
Russia in order to prosper and move from a pure extraction economy must seek to open up and allow for the creation of a full entrepreneurial society. It can adhere to many of its past ways but as to its relationship with the West it must seek trade related development.
The Kennan conclusion was:
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions.
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions.
Thus one wonders if Russia is going backwards or whether it will seek accommodations with the rest of the economic world. Perhaps we will only know when we see "Made in Russia" in Walmart.
A Measure of the Economy
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