On Leaders

 From Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of the Peace ( 1341 ) we have:

On bringing the leader to account, and for what  reason, how, and by whom he should be  constrained if he transgresses the law

 We said earlier that it belongs to the legislator to bring to account or  completely to change leaders, just as it does to institute them.

 On  this subject someone will quite rightly raise a doubt, viz. as to whether it  is expedient for leaders to be corrected through a judicial process and  coercive power; and if it is, whether this ought to take place for any kind  of excess, or only for some of them and not for others. Again, to whom it  belongs to pass such judgements upon them and to carry out the execution of these judgements by coercive power: since it was earlier said that it  belongs only to leaders to pass civil sentences and to constrain those who  transgress the law with coercive power.

 Let us for our part say that the leader, through his action according to the  law and through the authority that has been given him, is the standard  and the measure of any civil act whatsoever, in the manner of the heart in  an animal. And if the leader took on no other form than the law, his  authority, and the desire of acting in accordance with it, he would never commit any undue action or one that was subject to being corrected  or measured by anything else. In this way he himself as much as his action  would be the measure of every civil act on the part of others, while he  himself would never be measured by others: just like a well-formed heart  in an animal. For because the heart does not take on any form through  which it would be inclined to an action contrary to that which arises from  its natural virtue and heat, it always naturally performs its appropriate  action and never the contrary. Because of this it regulates and measures,  through its influence or action, the other parts of the animal in such a way  that it is not itself regulated by them in any way and receives no influence  from them either.   

 However, because the leader, being human, has an intellect and a desire  which can take on different forms – such as a false conception or a perverted  desire or both – it is possible for him, if he follows them, to do things  contrary to what is laid down by law. For this reason the leader is, in  these actions, rendered subject to measurement by something else that  has the authority to measure or regulate him (or those actions of his which  transgress the law) according to the law; for otherwise any leader  would become tyrannical, and the life of the citizens slavish and insufficient. And this is an evil to be avoided.  Now the judgement, command and execution of any arraignment of  the leader for his demerit or transgression should take place through the  legislator, or through a person or persons established for this purpose by  the authority of the legislator.

 It is also appropriate to suspend for a period of time the  office of the leader who is subject to correction, especially in relation to  the person or persons who must judge his transgression, so that faction,  commotion and fighting do not break out in the community because of  the resulting plurality of leaders; and also because he is not being  corrected as the leader, but as a subject who has transgressed the law.

 Basing on this principle, then, our approach to the doubts in question, let  us say that an excess on the part of the leader is either serious or slight;  again, it is either one of those things that can happen often, or that can  happen only rarely; still further, it is either something defined by law or  not. If the leader’s offence is serious – for example against the republic or  an important person or indeed any other person, where failure to bring  him to account would be likely to cause scandal or popular commotion –  then in this case the leader should be corrected for it, whether it is  something that happens often or only rarely. For if it remained unpunished, popular commotion and the disturbance and destruction of the  polity could be possible. If it is defined by law, then he should be  corrected according to the law; if it is not, then according to the sentence  of the legislator; and as much as possible ought to be defined by law,

 Now if an excess on the part of the leader is slight, then either it is one  of those things that happen only rarely, and is only rarely committed by  the leader, or it is one of those things that can occur often and is often  committed by the leader. If it is or is capable of being committed by  the leader only rarely, then one should turn a blind eye rather than have  the leader corrected for it. Because if the leader were corrected for any  minor excess that rarely happens, he would be rendered an object of  contempt; and this does no small damage to the community in that the  citizens as a result show less reverence and obedience to the law and to the  leader. And again because if the leader were unwilling to submit to  arraignment for every tiny offence, since this would diminish him in  repute, a serious scandal could arise. But nothing of this kind – which  cannot yield any evident utility, but only harm – should be aggravated in  communities.

 And this was Aristotle’s explicit opinion on the subject, Politics II  chapter 4, when he said: ‘It is manifest, that legislators and leaders must  be allowed a few misdeeds. For one who initiates a change does not do good so much as harm, becoming accustomed to rebel against leaders.’ 3  However, by ‘legislator’ he understood here the legislated law, which,  if men have become accustomed to obey it, he says should not be changed  in order to correct some minor thing in it, but should be allowed to stay as  it is; the reason being that frequent changing of the laws weakens their  strength, sc. the custom of obeying them and observing the commands  they contain. Hence the same author, in the same book and chapter: ‘The  law has no strength to persuade apart from custom, if it is to be  obeyed by the subjects, the most important thing is custom. It is the same  with reverence for and obedience to the leader.   

 However, if the excess on the part of the leader is slight but with the  possibility of happening often, then it should be defined in law, and a  leader who is frequently delinquent in respect of it should be constrained  by an appropriate penalty. For however slight, an offence of this type will  do significant damage to the polity if it is committed often, ‘just as substance’ (i.e. wealth) too ‘is eaten up by small expenditures made  often. For the whole, and everything, is not small, but is made up of  small things,’ as is written in Politics.