To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which
has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of
approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared
in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is
pretty well guarded.
I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that
if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an
eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. It
was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the
person to whom so important a trust was to be confided.
This end will be answered by committing the right of making
it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the
special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture. It was equally desirable,
that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
which were proper to govern their choice.
A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens
from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. It was also
peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and
disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a
magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the
government as the President of the United States.
But the precautions which have been so happily concerted
in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this
mischief.
The choice of several, to form an intermediate body of
electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any
extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of one who was himself to
be the final object of the public wishes.
And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to
assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and
divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might
be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened
at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable
obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one
quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper
ascendant in our councils.
How could they better gratify this, than by raising a
creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention
have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and
judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to
depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand
to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to
an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of
persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.
And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all
those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the
President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place
of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the
electors.
Thus, without corrupting the body of the people, the
immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from
any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation,
already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so,
to the conclusion of it.
The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so
considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means.
Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them,
dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded
upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt,
might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the
Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the
people themselves.
He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his
complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his
official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his
re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the
society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan
devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose
a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and
representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble
within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus
given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the
person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be
the President.
But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to
centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to
be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of
Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five
highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for
the office. The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office
of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of
popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single
State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to
establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so
considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful
candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States.
It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a
constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for
ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation
of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration.
Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the
poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest—That which is best
administered is best,”—yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a
good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with
the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to
the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to
the latter. The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has
been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous.
It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to
have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering
that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the
convention in this respect.
One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a
definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have
only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as
senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange,
in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote.
The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may
occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for
the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing
the other.
It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances,
the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State.
We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in
the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in
casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to
exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS
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